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The Peculiarities of the Germans? 
The aim of this essay is to identify a central assumption of 
historical writing about Germany and to consider some of its 
implications for our wider understanding of European and 
comparative history. That assumption concerns the alleged 
absence or failure of bourgeois revolution in German history and 
its consequences for Germany's future political development. It 
appears in the detailed literature on 1848 and the 1860s; in the 
general textbooks; and in much of the literature on later periods 
too. Above all, it appears as a strategic idea in most of the 
attempts to build deep historical explanations for the rise of 
Nazism and the weakness of German liberalism. 
But the implications go far beyond German history itself to 
embrace equally forthright conceptions of other national 
histories, particularly those of Britain and France. To the 
extent that all national historiographies rest on more or less 
elaborate systems of distinction, establishing the 
"peculiarities" of one country against the "otherness" of the 
rest, the idea of Germany's absent bourgeois revolution also 
possesses this hidden or latent comparative dimension. In 
addition, works of gener=l political theory tend to share the 
same view of the German past, especially when proceeding from a 
comparative historical perspective, whether Marxist or non- 
Uarxist: those of Barrington Moore9 Dahrendorf, and Poulantzas 
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are all good examples.' In other words* the idea that Germany 
had no bourgeois revolution forms the basis for a general 
interpretation of German history* which proposes its marked 
peculiarity when compared with the other states of Western 
Europe. 
How does this interpretation run? It begins with certain 
crucial deficiencies of the German bourgeoisie's political 
behavior* which are used to explain the -weakness of German 
liberalism in the century between 1848 and 1945. The German 
bourgeoisie is regarded as a weak and underdeveloped bourgeoisie* 
which failed as a c'lass to act in its own best interests. But 
,what exactly is meant by this assertion? Abstracting cautiously 
from an extremely large literature* it seems to imply the 
following: that the German bourgeoisie (by contrast* that is, 
with its counterparts elsewhere in the West) nas seriously 
lacking in "maturity" and political self-confidencer "incapable 
of developing an independent class.consciousness" of its own.' 
During the nineteenth century it failed to constitute itself as a 
self-conscious class-subject*. acting politically in its own 
collective interests, in direct confrontation with the 
established domination of a landowning aristocracy. On the 
contrary (so the . argument . . 
. -. - . - runs), -.. . - - -- . - so . -. - -. . far from realizing its 
essential interests in class struggle with the aristocracy* the 
bourgeoisie in Germany preferred to compromise with the old 
order* first in the 1848 Revolution* and then during the 
unification struggle of the 1860s. It allowed itself to become 
subordinated to the "pre-industrial ruling elite", failed to win 
basic reforms in the state, and permitted its own assimilation to 
the existing aristocratic and authoritarian value-system. 
Under the Second Empire (1871-19181, after the unification of 
Germany, this process was continued. The so-called 
'feudalization" of the bourgeoisie became heavily 
institutionalized. This was assisted by manipulative techniques 
of government (e.g. "social imperialism", - "secondary 
integrationD1, anti-socialism), which diverted the bourgeoisie 
from thoughts of further reform, and at which Bismarck was the 
supreme master. The socializing institutions of the Imperial 
state (school, church, army, university) also helped reconcile 
the bourgeoisie to a subordinate place in German society. 
Satisfied with the fruits of the new capitalist prosperity, 
enticed by the glitter of imperialism, and spurred by the 
carefully manipulated fear of-socialismr the German bourgeoisie 
settled for second best. There failed to develop -that 
"emancipatory will1' or "sense of citizenshipD8 that in Britain or 
France was thought to have sustained a process of 
democratization. Denied a "natural" outlet in liberal politics, 
it is often argued, bourgeois energies were directed elsewhere-- 
into business and commercial enterprise in one view, or 
philosophy and cultural contemplation in another. Either way, 
German public life lacked the vit'alizing liberalism of a 
bourgeoisie triumphant in its own hegemonic capability. Progress 
towards parliamentary government was disastrously interrupted. 
5 
The liberal-democratic tradition was stillborn, easing the 
of left and right, and prefiguring.the possibility 
of f a s ~ i s m . ~  
A s  a view of German society under the Kaiserreich, this has 
several interesting features. Before going further, I want to 
draw attention to three of these: 
( 1 )  Industrialization and Democracy 
First, this view reflects a set of larger assumptions about 
the bases of political development under industrial capitalism. 
Host German historians seem to accept that there should be some 
sort of logical fit between "the process of industrial growth" on 
the one hand, and "political modernization" on the other; and by 
"political modernization" in this context is meant the 
consolidation of liberal-democratic  institution^.^ Within that 
framework of assumptions the key question of German history 
becomes to establish why such a desirable- and ultimately 
necessary complementarity of economic and political forms failed 
to develop. Here is Ernst Fraenkel: the crucial question for 
German historians is that of "why . . . Germany has found it so 
difficult to understand the parliamentary form of government, to 
come to terms with it, and apply it successfully".~ Dahrendorf, 
in his influential and wide-ranging reflections on "society and 
democracy in Germany", puts the question in much the same way:" 
Why is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle 
of liberal democracy? There were enemies of liberalism- 
everywhere and still are today (sic). There may even be 
or have been other countries where liberal democracy-has 
found as little recognition as it did in Germany. 
. . .But in this study we want to find out what it is in 
tC:+-ew 
German society that may account for Germany's persistent : 
. failure to give a home to democracy in its liberal sense, 5% :&:z 
4."" .. 
In this view, the real crux of.Germany's "mistaken development" by ?$* 
=$; z 
comparison with the healthier trajectories of the "West" was the - I- $$&% 
t - .  7 
r i -2: - 
failure to create a "pluralist democracy", and the vital continuity %&: 
in German history is one of "authoritarian and anti-democratic "'I!:+: 
-%- 
structures in state and s ~ c i e t y " . ~  This postponed the inevitable P. r e  F: -. 
'i_ -
march of progress--i.e. the ultimate necessity of the "bourgeois 7*y > 
revolution" which would finally "open the road to modernity", in 
Dahrendorf's revealing phrase.- 
(2)  Pre-Industrial Traditions 
Secondly, German historians give the greatest explanatory 
weight to "pre-industrial continuitie~~'~ which under different 
circumstances a successful bourgeois revolution would,have swept 
away--what Hans-Ulrich Wehler calls the successful "defence of 
traditional ruling positions by pre-industrial ruling elites 
against the onslaught of new  force^".^ Thus the weakness of German 
liberalism under the Second Empire is explained not by what happens 
inside the Imperial period itself, but by the traditional hangovers 
of a previous era--i.e. not by the structures and conditions of an 
industrial-capitalist society (or by the specific political 
experiences of the period 1871-1918), but by "re-industrial" . .. ,. . . . . 
survivals thought to be out of step with the "normaln logic of 
industrialization. tloreover9 lurking within this argument is the 
further belief that by some universal criteria of "modernity" the 
unwillingness of the German bourgeoisie to struggle for additional 
' >  
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parliamentary and other reforms was an irrational'denial of its own 
best interests, certainly in the longer run. Thus the anti-trade 
union attitudes of the big employers in heavy industry is usually 
attributed to a "backwardn and abnormally reactionary mentality, 
which hampered the emergence of "modernU forms of industrial 
conciliation. This was one consequence of the bourgeoisie's 
defective consciousness, subordination, and deference to the 
aristocracy, exemplified by the internalization of traditional 
authoritarian values. A paternalist conception of industrial 
authority prevented the.big employers from developing an 
enlightened view of their own self-interest by acknowledging the 
= + , : I ,  . "just" demands of the working class for "social and political 
F2-5 . equality of status". Consequently, in Wehler's view, the "power- 
z+7 elites" again re-emphasized their ideological backwardness, because 
they were "neither willing nor able to introduce in good time the 
SL transition to modern social and political relationships".ao 
9 ., (3) Oriains of Fascism 
Thirdly, this type of argumentation also involves a particular 
view of fascism, which defines the latter very much by its long- 
term origins. Here the weakness of liberal-democratic traditions 
also signifies Germany's greater vulnerability to fascist or 
authoritarian politics. Thus the failure to "modernize" the 
political system under the Kaiserreich and to build a strong enough 
democratic consensus in the.Weimar Republic are both traced to the 
critical "defeats" of the bourgeoisie in 1848-71, with the 
resulting survival of "pre-industrial traditions"." In effect, 
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the problem of Nazism is redefined as a more general problem of 
political backwardness, what Dahrendorf calls the "structural 
syndrome" of German authoritarianism." ~ans-~Zrgen Puhle has put 
this particularly conveniently (if long-~indedly)~ explaining 
fascism in terms of a societyxa 
in which the consequences of delayed state-formation and 
delayed industrialization combined closely together with 
the effects of the absence of bourgeois revolution and the 
absence of parliamentarization to form the decisive brakes 
on political democratization and social emancipation. 
The explanation for Nazism is derived from a specific contrast with 
the deep histories of the "Western democracies", in which Germany's 
alleged absence of bourgeois revolution plays a key role. In other 
words9 the argument contains a powerful notion of German 
The Problem of Bourgeois Revolution 
Thus the assumption that Germany did not have a bourgeois 
revolution in the nineteenth century has structured our general 
understanding of the German past. It affects both the questions we 
ask and where we l'ook for the answers. Fixed on the apparent 
subordination of the bourgeoisie under the Kaiserreich and the 
seeming archaism of the Imperial state, most h.istorians address the 
- .  following question: . .. why . . was . . - . - the - . . . . -- German - . . .- -. . . . . . bourgeoisie not more 
liberal in the style of its French or British counterparts? 
Moreover, this is also thought to deliver an explanation for 
fascism, so that the conjunctural specificity of Nazism--why it 
happened when it did--is almost wholly collapsed into a description 
of its deeper nineteenth century origins. The peculiarity of 
German history is situated in a linear continuity of "pre- 
industrial traditions', which blocked the development of "modern 
political institutionsn. Arguably this leads to a view of the 
German past which is intellectually very undemanding. For the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries it produces a closed system of 
interpretation, each of whose elements presumes the others: 
because Germany produced Nazism, it was an illiberal society 
excessively vulnerable to authoritarianism; because it failed to 
qenerate a viable liberalism, it was an imperfectly 'modern" 
society; because the bourgeoisie is the agent of "modernization", 
Germany must have lacked a self-confident and class-conscious 
bourgeoisie; because the German bourgeoisie occupied a subordinate 
place in an aristocratically dominated society, Germany lacked a 
bourgeois revolution. 
If w e  turn to the concept of bourgeois revolution itself, 
moreover, it soon becomes clear that this rests on a series of 
normally unexplicated assumptions that are extremely questionable. 
Hy aim in examining these assumptions is not to convict individual 
historians of "error" and thereby dismiss their contributions. Nor 
am I suggesting that the ideas concerned may always be found as 
consciously adopted formulations. What follows is deliberately an 
exercise in abstraction, exploring the logic of certain influential 
interpretations to establish the limits of their explanatory 
purchase. I am interested in how the idea of "failed bourgeois 
revolution" functions in the discourse of German historians, with a 
view to opening up some new perspectives. Again: I am not 
interested in scoring points for their own sake, or with impugning 
the scholarship and intellectual credentials of previous 
historians. I am interested in defining a problem which might then 
be discussed, nothing more." In this sense there are several 
areas of difficulty: 
(a) Talk of Germany's "failed bourgeois revolutionn seems to 
imply that "modern industrial societies" worthy of the name 
must at some stage pass through a bourgeois revolution of the 
(attributed) British or French type. (This is especially marked in 
the case of Dahrendorf). Where such an experience fails to occur, 
as in Germany, we have an instance of "mis-development". As the 
model of successful bourgeois revolution is never discussed except 
by implication, however, we have to infer exactly what that 
entails. In passing, we may also note an irony of intellectual 
history: whereas the original coinage of "bourgeois revolution" 
was impeccably liberal, deriving from the early-nineteenth century 
conjunction of political economy and representative government (the 
term itself comes from Guizot), the present usage in the French and 
English-speaking worlds has become largely Marxist; non-Rarxist 
historians have retreated from that earlier conception of progress 
(now stigmatized as "whig"), in which the emergence of liberal 
institutions was precisely generated by the rise of a new social 
group, namely, the driving energy of a new entrepreneurial and non- 
noble propertied class, whose interests and behavior required the 
sweeping away of feudal and absolutist restrictions on economic 
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freedom and therefore a set of liberal political innovations; 
instead, a large body of developmental theory from the post-1945 
social sciences, economically and sociologically founded, but with 
no integral conception of revolutionary political transformation of 
the same pivotal kind, has crowded in to fill the intellectual 
space..- In Germany, by contrast, the older vocabulary of 
"bourgeois revolution" continues to coexist uneasily with the more 
recent framework of "modernization theory", which on the whole the 
post-sixties generation of West German historians has 
enthusiastically embraced. Given the present Marxist associations 
of the bourgeois revolution theory and the anti-Marxist orientation 
of modernization theory, this produces a disjointed eclecticism 
that can sometimes confuse. 
(b) In the light of the above, the meaning of bourgeois 
revolution has to be reconstructed from the general output of the 
historians concerned. On this basis the following definition seems 
to emerge: the "bourgeois'revolution" represents a set of changes 
forced through by the bourgeoisie itself, acting collectively in 
its own class interests, in direct confrontation with a "pre- 
industrial" or feudal ruling class. This entails a stress on 
motivations and the social identity of participants, implying that 
the bourgeoisie itself would be at the head of the revolutionary 
movement in an authentic bourgeois revolution, leading'the 
insurgent masses and seizing the helm of the state. Aside from the 
empirical objections (which should be clear enough from the 
literatures on the English and French Revolutions), this raises 
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serious theoretical problems. For one, it presumes that the 
bourgeoisie can be conceptualized in the first place as a corporate 
political actor, with a collective class interest traceable through 
particular events and ideas in a directly expressive way, speaking 
through the acts of individual politicians- Though Marxist in 
origin, this is not perhaps a conception many Marxists would now 
defend.=& On the other hand, it seems to be present in much German 
historiography "in a practical state". At the very least, it is 
not inconsistent with how German historians currently talk about 
the nineteenth century. 
(c) Thirdly, talk of the German bourgeoisie's political 
failings strongly implies that the "rising" bourgeoisie (if, that 
is, it is to be regarded as a fully-formed class-conscious 
bourgeoisie) should be naturally or necessarily liberal in its 
political inclinations. There is often a great deal of conceptual 
slippage from "bourgeois" to "liberal" in the writings of German 
historians, confusing the two terms' legitimate applications, with 
a tendential (and tendentious) reduction of politics to class. As 
Laclau has observed in another context, this involves the common 
assumption that sDecific ideologies have a specific class- 
belonainq, in the sense that they are historically the "natural 
property' of a particular class or social group.a7 This is so 
pervasive a habit that it barely needs detailed demonstr-ation, but 
some salient examples would be the following: anti-Semitism as the 
natural property of small producers threatened by industrialization 
OF "modernization"; socialism as the natural property of a class- 
conscious proletariat; liberalism as the natural property of a 
rising bourgeoisie; and finally, authoritarianism (as in Imperial 
Germany) as the natural property of a "feudalized" and subordinate 
bourgeoisie, which has failed to constitute itself as a self- 
conscious class-subject through a successful bourgeois revolution. 
Hany others could be added. These days, when neconomism" and 
"reductionism" of different kinds have become the cardinal sin of 
materialist analysis, it seems hardly necessary to expatiate on the 
drawbacks of this approach. But the habitual conflation of 
*bourgeoisie" (an economic or sociological category, to which a 
varied repertoire of outlooks and cultural traits may be 
historically attached) and "liberalism" (a specific ideology and 
type of politics), where the one becomes a logical accompaniment or 
consequence of the other, is clearly worth noting (and doing 
something about 
(dl In most discussions of 1848 in Germany events seem to be 
measured against a straightforward polarity of alternatives: 
liberal victory through the triumphant voluntarism of an anti- 
monarchist revolution, or the armed counter-revolution of resurgent 
aristocratic authoritarianism and the restoration of the pre-March 
monarchy. In this nay, the test of success for both the bourgeois 
revolution and an authentic liberalism becomes a particular 
abstract model of the revolutionary process. (Parenthetically, we 
might say that this model is informed more by later conceptions of 
revolutionary change and party organization than by any sensible 
understanding of what happened in the 1640s and 17891. In this 
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sense the bourgeois revolution appears as a contest, which the 
bourgeoisie must either win or lose, with state-power as the 
coveted prize. This strict polarity of alternatives is not very 
helpful for unscrambling the complexity of events, the shifting 
configuration of political forces, or the full range of possible 
outcomes. 
(el Finally, there is the most dubious assumption of all, 
namely, that the model of "bourgeois revolution" attributed to the 
British and French cases ( i  .e. , .  of a forcibly acquired liberal 
democracy seized by a triumphant bourgeoisie, acting politically as 
a class, in conscious struggle with a feudal aristocracy) actually 
occurred. This assumption is the most basic and questionable of 
all. For the thesis of Germany's absent bourgeois revolution, in 
so far as we can reconstruct the concept's specific content, 
presupposes a reading of the English and French Revolutions that 
has long been discredited in the national literatures concerned. 
Of course, the simplified reduction of other national histories 
into ideal-typical models for the purposes of comparison has a 
long, not to say respectable provenance- But there is a certain 
poignancy in the reliance of mostly non-Harxist (and frequently 
anti-Harxist) historians on an old shibboleth of vulgar Harxism, 
which recent historical work has cast into disrepute. In an oddly 
similar controversy concerning the "absence" of a proper bourgeois 
revolution in Britain, Edward Thompson dealt this kind of thinking 
a devastating blow:aT 
I am objecting to a model which concentrates 
attention upon one dramatic episode--- Revolution--to 
which all that goes before and after must be related; and 
which insists upon an ideal type of this Revolution 
against which all others must be judged. Hinds which 
thirst for a tidy platonism very soon become impatient 
with actual history. The French Revolution was a 
fundamental moment in the history of the West, and in its 
rapid passage through a gamut of experiences it afforded 
incomparable insights and prefigurements of subsequent 
conflicts. But because it was a gigantic experience it 
wasnot necessarily a typical one. So far from an 
advanced, egalitarian, left-Jacobin phase being an 
intrinsic part of any fulfilled- bourgeois revolution, 
recent research into the role of the Parisian crowd, the 
actual social composition of the sections and the 
institutions of the Terror and of the revolutionary 
armies, as well as into the national emergency of war 
dictatorship, calls into question how far it is meaningful 
to characterize the Jacobinism of Year I1 as an authentic 
 bourgeois" experience at all. And certainly the 
industrial bourgeoisie cannot be credited with being 
either the **vanguard8* of Jacobinism or the major social 
force upholding this profoundly ambiguous political 
movement. 
In other words, the social determinations of revolutionary crises 
(whether in France in 1789, Germany in 1848 or elsewhere) remain 
extremely complex, and the specific contribution of the bourgeoisie 
and its different fractions far from clear. At all events, what we 
can say is that British and French historians have largely 
abandoned the schematic notion of bourgeois revolution (as in tbl 
above) German historians still appear to assume. 
Thus the very concept of bourgeois revolution as German 
historians seem to understand it is itself problematic. At the 
same time, identifying "bourgeois revolution" with a necessary 
measure of parliamentary democracy also dictates a particular view 
of the Imperial state--namely, as a system of "pre-industrial 
domination" which assigned the bourgeoisie as such to a junior 
place. Because a retrospective measure of mature liberal democracy 
is applied, the Imperial state is inevitably found "backward"; and 
because "democratization" is diagnosed a s  an immanent purpose of 
the historical process in Western Europe, a "discrepancy" is not 
surprisingly discovered between an advanced economy and a 
retrograde polity. In the argument's familiar terms, "political 
modernization" had failed to ke,ep pace with 88industrialization". 
Two consequences follow from this position, certainly in the 
practice of its exponents' historiography. On the one hand, it 
follows- that the Kaiserreich was condemned to political instability 
till its political institutions became adequately "modernized": 
without the latter its governments would stay trapped in a logic of 
"manipulation" and "secondary integration", which could only end in 
disaster. (and did). On .the other hand, the idea that German 
history before 1945 provides an example of "mis-development" has to 
imply some notion of what a "correct" development would have been-- 
i-e., a normative understanding of how "modern" societies should 
develop. In this case, liberal democracy becomes the manifest 
destiny of the bourgeoisie, which in the German example is somehow 
alienated. 
Some Conse~uences 
What follows from these observations? In the most general 
terms we clearly need to rethink the problem of bourgeois 
revolution if the term is to keep its value, and this has 
implications far outside the German discussion. In my view, any 
sensible discussion will have to proceed from the following points: 
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(1) The Complexitv of Revolutions 
Revolutions are complex configurations of events and 
participating forces, for which any single formula remains 
procrustean. If we ask the question, "what i s  the revolution 
about?", we can expect contradictory answers, depending on the 
particular group of participants, the part of the country, and 
the phase of the process. In particular, the relationship of the 
great seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century 
revolutions to the longer-run processes of social change that- 
preceded them remains anything but clear. We can certainly put 
them in a general context of social change, involving expanding 
capitalist production in town and country, the dislocation of 
customary social relations, the re-ordering of state/society 
relations, and so on. We can also reasonably suggest that from 
the process of change there gradually crystallized a new social 
force--a bourgeoisie-in-the-making, shall we say--in whose 
cultural presence, social place, and general comportment the new 
changes were condensed, and which began to assert its leadership 
in society.and even (though not necessarily) its right to control 
the state. But at the same time, it seems mistaken "to 
subordinate all other forms of social antagonism to the conflict 
between a generically defined *bourgeoisies and the ancien 
regime". In fact, the 1848 revolutions (to return to our 
immediate example) may best be seen as a "polarization of large 
and small producers, articulated By a radicalized intelligentsia 
of ex-university students and young profe~sionals".~~ If this 
1s 
was sos the specific political content of the revolutionary 
processes was highly contingent and can't be reduced to any pat 
formula of ascribed bourgeois consciousness, By now, it seems 
incontestably the, case that the revolutionary impetus came as 
much from those who were seeking to oppose or hold up the agenda 
of social change as from those seeking to impose it. Indeed, the 
capitalist bourgeoisie proper usually acted as a conservative 
force in the revolutionary process itself, with constitutional 
goals that were strictly limited. 
(2) Levels of Explanation 
This forces us to separate very carefully the content of 
the popular revolutionary struggles from the actual changes which 
in the end they helped to confirm (or at least failed to 
obstruct). This leads to further distinctions--between the 
social and occupational backgrounds of the revolutionaries and 
the social relations of domination and exploitation that 
constrained their actions; between intention and effect: and 
between how the revolution was "made" and how its experience was 
eventually assimilated. Abstractly, this means distinguishing 
between two levels of determination or significance in the 
revolutionary conjuncture: between the revolution as a specific 
crisis of the state, involving widespread popular mobilization 
and a reconstitution of political relationships; and, on the 
other hand, the deeper processes of structural change, involving 
the increasing predominance of the capitalist mode of production, 
the potential obsolescence of many existing institutions and 
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practices, and the uneven transformation of social relations. 
How these two levels--change at the level of the state, change in 
the social formation--became articulated together in the 
revolutionary conjuncture of a 1789 or an 1848 is a matter for 
detailed historical investigation, and can't be legislated in 
theory, whether Marxist or any other. 
(3) Bouraeoisie--Liberalism--Democracy 
Nex.t, we have to break once and for all the obstinate 
linkage of liberalism as a political movement and the necessary 
class interest of the whole bourgeoisie. At a theoretical level, 
this identification is overly determinist and class-reductionist. 
But several particular comments may also be made. 
First, as a political tradition nineteenth-century 
liberalism was always rooted. in rarger social coalitions, which 
extended downwards from the industrial, commercial, and 
professional bourgeoisie into the petty bourgeoisie, artisanate, 
peasantry, and working class. At the same time, as an ideology 
of progress liberalism envisaged a type of society in which the 
bourgeoisie as a class could be dominant. tloreover, although 
liberalism could never be the "party of the bourgeoisie" in any 
simple or directly expressive way, the bourgeoisie proper could 
obviously do much to influence the character of the liberal 
aovement, both regionally and nationally. It "led", not 
necessarily by numerical dominance on the liberal executives or 
in the organs of liberal opinion (though this could easily be 
true), but by a. particular structure of interests, prejudices, 
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and aspirations, which set tasks for liberal leaderships and 
limits to their possible options. In this case the web of 
relationships between dominant groups and a wider popular 
constituency--i.e., the mediation of liberal hegemony--becomes 
crucial. Here we may simply note that the degree of subaltern 
groups' real integration (and hence the liberal coalition's 
degree of unity and cohesion) varied enormously, from country to 
country and region to region. As Stedman Jones has suggested, 
the more developed the social formation, the stronger the 
economic power of the bourgeoisie proper, and the greater the 
social and political distance from the mass of the small traders 
and producers; "conversely, the less developed the bourgeoisie, 
the smaller the gulf between 'bourgeois' and 'petty bourgeois', 
and the greater the preponderance and cohesion of the popular 
movement"."l Once the new industrial working class was added to 
the picture, the degree and forms of variation became all the 
greater. 
Secondly, the nineteenth-century liberal coalitions were 
characterized not only by 88vertical" but also by "horizontal" 
integration. They were never exclusively an urban formation, but 
always had links to the countryside, not only via appeals to the 
rural masses (peasants, artisans, small traders), but through 
close relations to the landed interest. Whether we call the 
latter an "agrarian bourgeoisie" or retain it as a separate 
category (to speak of a "feudal aristocracy" becomes increasingly 
inappropriate, surely, after the post-Napoleonic settlement, even 
C 
east of the Elbe), it was always part of the liberal universe, 
through intermarriage and other forms of social intercourse, 
through commercial interpenetration, or through corporate 
political alliance. Though German historians tend to see the 
industrial-agrarian alliance of the late nineteenth century as 
some sort of peculiarity, it should probably be seen as a 
variation on a much broader theme. Similar processes of 
interpenetration (though naturally in different forms and over 
different periods) can be found in Britain, Italy, and France as 
we1 1 
Thirdly, we should never forget that the term 
"bourgeoisie" is strictly speaking a sociological category, which 
tells us nothing necessaril-y about the political behavior of 
particular bourgeoisies or their individual members. A great 
deal could be said, for instance, about the bourgeoisie's 
regional diversity and internal differentiation, and the variable 
form of its relations with other groups. Given such 
indeterminacy, it makes little sense to generalize predictively 
and collectively about the bourgeoisie's political behavior, 
whether in revolutionary or other situations. 
Fourthly, the degree of liberalism achieved during the 
. . -  - . -  . .. . . -. . . . . - . . . . - . - - 
revolutionary process depends---far more on pressures exerted by 
the popular forces than on the spontaneous inclinations of the 
bourgeoisie proper, and in practice the latter's various 
groupings might commit themselves just as easily to authoritarian 
as to liberal politics. On this basis, the degree of liberal- 
A 
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democratic progress is possibly an inappropriate measure of the 
success or authenticity of the bourgeois revolution. Indeed, 
specifically democratic achievements have rarely been the 
intended result of violent political upheavals in which the 
bourgeoisie as such played a leading part. More often they have 
occurred through protracted histories of political conflict, 
commonly precipitated by the interventions of non-bourgeois 
subaltern groups--"plebeians", the menu peuvle, eventually the 
working class. Both the British parliamentary and French 
republican traditions were formed in their different ways from 
complex and extended conflicts of this type. On these criteria, 
German society was more rather than less "modern", because it 
generated a vigorously independent democracy (in the form of the 
SPD) at a much earlier stage, going far beyond the populist 
rhetoric of Gladstonian liberalism and the French radicals.== 
(4) Satisfvina the Bouraeoisie 
If we ask what is specifically "bourgeois" about the 
bourgeois revolution, we do far better to focus on the 
consequences of the revolutionary process than on the agency or 
conscious intentions of the actors."' But if we accept this line 
of argument, what sort of outcome should we be looking for? As a 
start, we can do far worse than quote Harx himself, summarizing 
the cumulative effects of the French and English R e v o l u t i ~ n s : ~ ~  
the proclamation of the political order for the new 
European society . . . the victory of bourgeois property 
over feudal property, or nationality over provincialism, 
of competition over guild, of the partition of estates 
over primogeniture,. of the owner's mastery of the land 
over the land's mastery of its owner, or enlightenment 
over superstition, of the family over the family name, of 
industry over heroic laziness, of civil law over 
privileges of medieval origin. 
In this catalogue of transformations there is no mention, 
significantly, of a liberal-democratic constitution, though we 
could probably make a good case in the abstract for seeing libera? 
political forms as not inconsistent with these other objectives. 
In fact, Marxists have ~lassically argued that the political 
groundwork for capitalist economic development (including the 
attack on absolutist forms of taxation and fiscal management, the 
destruction of feudal residues and the deregulation of the 
protected economy, the emancipation of the peasantry and the 
freeing of the land, the removal of restrictions on enterprise and 
the mob.ility of capital and labor, and the creation of the national 
market) also created the positive basis for liberal forms of 
government, and.that beyond a certain point the ascendancy of 
liberal ideas became functional for the development of capitalist 
relations. The liberty to accumulate capital and trade freely was 
also the liberty to participate in a free political life The 
struggle for capitalism and against feudalism was also the struggle 
for constitutional government. Economic and political freedoms 
were homologous. Progress was indivisible in that sense. 
. . . - . - - . .. 
Moreover, this was not an identity imposed on liberalism by 
tlarxists from the outside; it was inscribed at the center of 
liberalism's classic doctrinal formulations. But although the 
drive to establish the overriding legitimacy of bourgeois property 
rights in the social formation.laid the material basis for liberal 
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political traditions, those same conceptions of property also 
structured and qualified the notions of government liberals then 
produced. In Locker for instance, questions of rights and 
representation were always predicated on notions of property. 
"Though in abstract terms, civil society was composed of a mass of 
free and equal individuals, in concrete terms it was implicitly 
acknowledged to be composed of the actual quite unequal classes of 
the propertied and the propertylessn.- Historically, liberal 
doctrine both postulated and presumed the universality of bourgeois 
property relations, In Locke's outlook, "'free born Englishmen' 
with rights of representation were inevitably propertied menn, As 
Hall remarks: 
. . . by way of this unstated presupposition, the whole 
class and gender structure of market society, the new 
relationships of property and capital, the emerging social 
order of bourgeois society and the structure of sexual 
divisions were premised at the heart of his doctrine as 
the silent but salient, absent/present assumption on which 
its logic was founded. 
However, the specific constitutional arrangements compatible 
with the liberal philosophical outlook and with the realization of 
bourgeois interests in the above sense could vary enormously; and 
the latter could also dispense with the stronger liberal formulae 
of representative government entirely, as this paper has been 
taking some pains to explain. In that case, it makes more sense to 
associate bourgeois consciousness with the pursuit of the less 
political virtues, like competition, merit, secularism, law and 
order, and so on. In fact, there are good grounds for proceeding 
extremely cautiouslyr with a minimalist definition. Stedman Jones 
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has argued that "the triumph of the bourgeoisie should be seen as 
the global victory of a particular form of property relations and a 
particular form of control over the means of production, rather 
than as the conscious triumph of a class subject which possessed 
distinct and coherent view of the world". Hence the definition of 
bourgeois revolution should be confined "to the successful 
installation of a legal and political framework in nhich the free 
development of capitalist property relations is assured".e7 
( 5 )  Revolution as Process, not Event 
If we accept this suggestion, several others follow. If we 
abandon the older idea of bourgeois revolution as a necessary stage 
of forcibly acquired, spontaneously generated liberality, through 
which any "modern" society ought to pass, then the details of the 
revolutionary upheaval itself become far less important. And if we 
push this argument further in the same direction, then we're likely 
to stress much longer processes of structural change, in nhich what 
is usually regarded as the revolution becomes just a particularly 
violent and dramatic episode. In this vein, Edward Thompson has 
referred to the entire period from the fifteenth to the early- 
nineteenth centuries and the individual moments of political change 
within it as the 'pieces of that great arch which, in fact, in the 
epochal sense, make up the bourgeois revoluti~n".~~ In The A p e  of 
Ca~ital, Eric Hobsbawm takes a similar view, stressing the 
bourgeoisie's overall cultural predominance rather than its 
collective political domination of the state, with implicit 
recourse to Gramsci's concept of h e g e m ~ n y . ~ ~  At the same time, 
this means withdrawing from the idea that the bourgeois revolution 
represents primarily a moment of convulsive, violent political 
change, and there is something of this in Gramsci's own idea of 
"passive revolution" tooeaO Now, to the extent that this involves 
a retreat from the problem of causality--from the problem of 
relating specific political events like the English or French 
Revolutions to the longer-run processes of social change--it 
amounts to a serious weakness. 
(6) Revolution From Above 
To redefine bourgeois revolution in terms of consequences and 
lasting effects, and to play down the conscious agency of the 
bourgeoisie in the revolutionary process, also facilitates the idea 
of "revolution from above". The unification of Germany, the 
Risoraimento in Italy, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan, all lend 
themselves to this sort of analysis. Each was a "bourgeois 
revolution from above" in the specific sense of delivering the 
legal and political preconditions for a society in which the 
capitalist mode of production could be dominant. This was achieved 
by innovative interventions by the existing states, or at least by 
the radical pragmatism of "modernizing" tendencies within them, but 
without the social turbulence and insurrectionary initiatives that 
characterized the previous Franco-British experiences. In neither 
Germany nor Italy (the Japanese case is more difficult) was the 
action of the state wholly autonomous, or unrelated to wider 
processes of social change, naturally, although the latter might 
easily be imposed from the outside, as in the Napoleonic occupation 
27 
of Germany and parts of Italy, or th= threatening incursion of 
Western influences into nineteenth-century Japan. In this sense 
Bismarck's radical solution to the German question, in 
circumstances of constitutional confrontation with an impressively 
resurgent German liberalism, provides the classic instance of 
revolution from above, substituting military unification and direct 
political negotiation with the constitutionalist opposition for the 
confusing scenario of the Franco-British experiences. In cer'tain 
ways--e.g., the sharpness of the rupture, the definitive character 
of the legal settlement, the commanding strength of capital in the 
new national economy--German unification in the 1860s was more 
closely linked to the realization of specifically bourgeois 
interests than either the English or the French Revolutions had 
been, precisely because significant popular interventions never had 
the chance to occur. 
To make the idea of revolution from above stick, we need to 
consider the overall European context, spatially and temporally. 
On the one hand, the German and Italian unifications occupied a 
distinct temporality when compared with the earlier sequence of the 
Dutch, British, American, and French  revolution^.^^ Where the 
latter occurred before the global victory of capitalist relations 
on a European, let alone world, scale, the nineteenth-century 
sequence actively presupposed the triumph of capitalism; where the 
earlier revolutions were driven forward by broad coalitions of 
large and small property-owners, the later ones lost this popular 
impetus to an intervening process of social differentiation, which 
set the bourgeoisie proper against the mass of pauperized small 
producers and the infant working class. The growth of an 
independent popular radicalism, which by the 1860s was already 
separately organized into nascent socialist parties, constrained 
the oppositional potential of the German bourgeoisie, whose 
political imagination had in any case been somewhat chastened by 
the spectacle of terror, barricades, and popular insurrection West 
of the Rhine. This tension, between the modernizing aspirations of 
the progressive bourgeoisie and its fears of popular mobilization, 
opened the necessary space for a "Bismarckian" solution, which 
implemented most features of the liberal program (e.g., national 
economic integration, freedom of trade, standardization of 
currency? weights and measures, and commercial practice? 
codification of the law,.and so on), while stifling the pressure 
for a full parliamentary constitution. 
But if the violent political histories of the English and 
French Revolutions cautioned the German bourgeoisie (keeping the 
masses off the streets was a good exchange for protecting the 
Hohenzollern neck), the impressive developmental progress of 
British society had precisely the opposite effect. In the triumph 
of Britain's industrial prosperity, the German bourgeoisie saw 
their own future reflected. Of course, the further to the East9 
the greater the discrepancy between this developmental aspiration 
and society's rea-l capacity for emulation. But from the early 
nineteenth century the developmental experience of Western Europe 
was being systematically appropriated further to the East as an 
. 
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.imitative program well in' advance of the indigenous social 
development that might have spontaneously sustained it. There is a 
necessary political precocity to the efforts of the more backward 
societies of Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe to bridge the 
developmental gap. Revolutionary programs become an anticipation 
of desirable change, rather than rationalizing the accumulation of 
existing development. This larger European context--classically 
encapsulated in the formula of uneven and combined development--is 
,central to the idea of revolution from 
( 7 )  fin Open A~enda 
Of course, all this is extremely general. But there's a 
necessary element of abstraction to this sort of discussion, which 
should be positively regarded, and doesn't necessarily vitiate or 
prejudge the outcome of more concrete historical investigations. 
Having stressed the separation of intention and effect, and the 
relative unimportance of the detailed events in the revolutionary 
process for defining the ultimate character of "the" revolution, 
therefore? we must clearly return to the concrete circumstances of 
particular revolutions. It's all very well to stress "the global 
victory of a particular form of property relations" rather than the 
conscious agency of a collective class subject in defining the rise 
< 
and eventual triumph of the bourgeoisie, or to distinguish crises 
of the state (the revolutionary process in the narrower sense) from 
deeper or longer-run processes of structural change. These 
necessary separations may salve the troubled theoretical conscience 
of post-Althusserian flarxism, with its salutary insistence on 
L 
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getting the auestions right. But in the end, the latter have to be 
reconvened on far more concrete terrainp in the analysis of 
particular events. Despite the clarification of terms (an entirely 
necessary procedure), we are not much closer to the problem of 
revolutionary causality in the most basic sense of all--that of how 
exactly the underlying processes of capitalist development 
contributed to the escalation of political contradictions, 
culminating in the DDruptural unity" of the revolutionary crisis 
itself. fit present, Marxists have been better at asserting this 
relationship in theory than at-showing in it concrete historical 
analysis.- 
In the classical Marxist tradition this problem of causality is 
posed in a very specific way, by according the bourgeois revolution 
a functional place in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
The terms of the argument (involving processes of class formation, 
non-correspondence of forces and relations of production, and 
violent change to secure the capitalist mode's predominance in the 
social formation) are familiar, with their locus classicus in the 
famous 1859 "Pref aceD' :=4 
At a certain stage of development, the material 
productive forces of society come into conflict with the 
existing relations of production or--this merely expresses 
the same thing in legal terms--with the property relations 
within the framework of which they have operated hitherto- 
From forms of development of the productive forces these 
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of 
social revolution". 
Here the bourgeois revolution becomes a necessary moment of 
concentrated, violent change, with an outcome logically determined 
by the previous processes of development* inscribed in the ever- 
worsening contradictions of the old social order. 
Now, among English-speaking Marxists this way of posing the 
problem (the logical or functional linkage of bourgeois revolution 
to processes of transition) became gradually discarded* even 
suppressed, in the 1950s and 1960s. Maurice Dobb's Studies in the 
Development of Caeitalism (first ed. 194619 for all its attested 
virtues, omit such a discussion almost entirely.=- This is perhaps 
most marked in the later works of Christopher Hill, where the 
confident pronouncements of The Encalish Revolution (originally 
published in 1940) and The Good Old Cause (edited with Edmund Dell 
in 1949) gradually give way to more cautious  formulation^.^^ The 
renewal o f  interest in the "transition" debate in the mid-1970s 
has been notable for it silence on the subject of bourgeois 
revol~tion."~ tloreover, the "gentry controversy" and the debate 
about the "general crisis of the seventeenth century' were probably 
... 
the last points at which the problem o f  the "English Rev01ution~~ 
was taken seriously by general historical scholarship, and since 
that time a flood of historical revisionism has left Marxist and 
other radical historians very defensive o n  the subject.=- Work on 
the French Revolution has experienced a similar process* for while 
. - .  
French historians still accept the concept of the Revolution 
(unlike many o f  their British colleagues)~ the commitment to 
theorizing its characteristics has all but dissolved in the vast 
production of detailed empirical s c h o l a r ~ h i p . ~ ~  Furthermore, as I 
suggested at the beginning of this paper* outside the Harxist 
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traditi-on it is unclear what the term "bourgeois revolution" could 
exactly mean, short of an unlikely reversion to the classical 
early-nineteenth century unities of political economy and 
constitutionalism, i.e., to the optimistic vision of progress that 
originally carried the concept into public discourse. 
So, in other words,,we are facing very much an open agenda. 
An older Marxist conception9 which stressed the leading agency of 
the bourgeoisie itself in the revolutionary process, the unitary 
character of its consciousness as a collective class actor, and the 
expressive properties of liberalism as a class ideology, is 
deservedly in eclipse (though the extent to which such ideas were 
actually held by practising Harxist historians can always be 
exaggerated). It has fallen before a continuing onslaught of 
empirical scholarship on the English and French Revolutions, much 
of it of the highest quality. But while the deficiencies have been 
recognized, Marxists have been very reluctant to take on the job of 
constructing an adequate alternative. As mentioned above, the 
closest we have come is the shift from "intention" to "effect", and 
to "processY from "event", with some discussion of "revolution from 
above" as a neglected form. Outside the ranks of the Harxists the 
inability to propose alternative conceptualizations is just as 
d i ~ a p p o i n t i n g . ~ ~  The question arises of whether we should simply 
cut our losses and abandon the concept of bourgeois revolution . 
altogether, and in these days of Marxist iconoclasm there is no 
33 
reason to view such a prospect with dismay (for those of us who 
remain within the tlarxist tradition, that is). But for our 
immediate purposes, this extreme theoretical indeterminacy makes 
the apparent acquiescence of German historians in the 
appropriateness of the old formula all the more striking. In 
conclusion, therefore, it is to the German case that we must 
again return. 
Provisional Conclusions 
In much of this essay I have tried to pose what seems to 
me the main dilemma of materialist analysis in the late-twentieth 
century, whether the latter is to be tlarxist or some other form 
of sociology: having pursued the logic of the anti-reductionist, 
anti-economistic critique to the full, with due respect for the 
autonomies of ideology, politics, and the state, how should the 
importance of social determinations be reinstated--or more to the 
point, how should the latter be measured in the analysis of 
concrete situations? Having pulled economics and politics, or 
the social and the political, apart* how do we put them together 
again? In the terms of this essay, if the bourgeoisie and 
liberalism are to be uncoupled, if the latter is no longer to be 
. . .  - .  ....* . . . . - - - . . . . . .- . - . . . . - . .. . - - - - - - - - 
regarded as a "bourgeois ideology" in the traditional 
(essentialist, expressive, instrumental) sense--if liberalism is 
to lose its powerful class connotation in that sense--then how is 
the nature of the relationship to be re-conceived? If liberalism 
can no longer be conceived as "the political outlook of the 
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rising bourgeoisie" (as one leading German historian regards 
itIr4l then how is the bourgeois contribution to liberal 
movements to be defined? I f  we have to stop regarding the 
bourgeoisie as a collective class-subject, and if class as an 
inter-subjective unity (as opposed to an economic or sociological 
category) has to be given up--if there can be no bourgeois "class 
consciousness" in that strong theoretical sense--then how else 
can the question of bourgeois political agency be defined? 
In all of these ways, this essay will certainly have 
raised far more questions than it has answered, and the answers 
it has provided will doubtless seem attenuated or schematic. The 
role o f  the state in the conception of revolution from above, for 
instance, remains necessarily under-developed in the above 
discussion, and I certainly don't mean to introduce the notion of 
a completely independent institutional agency in this context; 
but in this particular essay there can be question of specifying 
the full complexity of nineteenth-century state analysis, as 
opposed to briefly indicating a question for future discu~sion.~e 
Likewise, though raised in the above discussion, the question of 
the relationship between long-term processes of capitalist 
development and the major European revolutions has obviously not 
been answered, and it may be that intellectual investment in the 
existence of such a relationship should finally be given up; but 
my point is that Marxists too must now call the question, and 
begin the arduous business of appropriating the last twenty years 
of empirical research for that end. In both cases the question 
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of theory needs history for an answer, but with a care, a 
concreteness, and a detail that would burst the bounds of this 
particular text. At one level', of course, such questions reflect 
the continuing contemporary theoretical preoccupation with 
problems of agency and structure. At another they reflect a more 
specific set of debates in the British. (and European) Left 
concerning the relationship between politics and class.4S 
One area of historical analysis where my general 
discussion can be immediately re-engaged is that of nineteenth- 
century Germany and the dominant views of the Kaiserreich. In 
conclusion, therefore, and for the purposes of future discussion, 
I would like to offer the following theses: 
(a) First, we can make a reasonable case for arguing that 
Germany did, after all, experience a successful bourgeois 
revolution in the nineteenth century. This didn't take the form 
of a pitched battle between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, 
in which the former seized state power from traditional monarchy 
and replaced it with parliamentary democracy. But then it didn't 
anywhere else in Europe either, certainly not in Britain in the 
seventeenth century, and certainly not in France in 1789. This 
view of the bourgeois revolution, where the insurgent bourgeoisie 
- . -. .. - - - - - - - - - -- - - . . . . .. 
triumphantly realizes its class interests in a program of heroic 
liberal democracy, is a myth. But if we associate bourgeois 
revolution with a lar,ger complex of change--instead of a strictly 
defined political process of democratic reform--which 
cumulatively established the conditions of possibility for 
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industrial capitalism, then there are good reasons for seeing the 
process of 'revolution from above" in the 1860/70s as Germany's 
distinctive form of the bourgeois revolution, so that we focus 
more on the material orobjective consequences of events than on 
their motivational origins. We have to accept that bourgeois 
revolution may vary considerably in its national forms, and 
certainly can't be identified with either the British or the 
French examples, not least because the latter themselves remain 
in hot dispute. In other words, the German pattern of revolution 
from above (spanning, say, the two periods of 1807-12 and 1862- 
71) was just as conducive to bourgeois predominance as the 
different developmental trajectories of Britain, the US&, and 
France. This leaves open the question of whether "bourgeois 
revolution" is the .appropriate term for the general process. 
(b) Secondly, it is quite wrong to see the bourgeoisie 
under the German Empire as being somehow politically weak or 
"immature", or as failing by some obscure criteria to realize its 
collective interests as a class. In any case, it is both 
theoretically misconceived and empirically impossible to view the 
bourgeoisie as a single inter-subjective unity in this way, 
because politicallv (though not economically or sociologically) 
there can only be different tendencies within the bourgeoisie, 
which in different situations may achieve a higher or lower 
degree of cohesion. But more specifically, this hides the fact 
that the interests of different bourgeois groupings or fractions 
may be pursued and secured via other than liberal, let alone 
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democratic, means. In other words, it is time finally to accept 
that the Imperial state of 1871-1918 was actually compatible with 
the adequate realization of legitimate bourgeois interests and . 
aspirations. The Empire was not an irredeemably backward and 
archaic state indelibly dominated by "pre-industrial", 
"traditional", or "aristocratic" values and interests, but was 
powerfully constituted between 1862 and 1879 by (among other 
things) the need to accommodate overriding bourgeois-capitalist 
interests. 
(c) Following on from this, we need to re-evaluate both 
the origins and significance of the Second Empire's evident 
"authoritarianism" (i.e., the limited extent of its parliamentary 
democratic development). This partly.requires a revision of 
theoretical perspective. German "authoritarianism" was not 
unavoidably bequeathed by an iron determinism of "pre-industrial 
continuitiesu, but was specifically overdetermined by the 
evolving disposition of forces within the German social formation 
as it entered its predominantly capitalist phase--above all, by 
the simultaneous existence of significant aristocratic enclaves 
in the structure of the state and a powerful Social Democratic 
labor movement in German society, and by important contradictions 
between different fractions of the bourgeoisie. In other words, 
in tackling the problem of "Germany's persistent failure to give 
a home to democracy in its liberal sense" (Dahrendorf), we have 
to be extremely careful what kind of question we're asking, 
because in the present discussion two distinct problems are being 
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confused, On the one hand, there is the question of the 
conditions under which a bourgeois-capitalist society could 
reproduce itself, or the legal9 political9 and ideological 
conditions of existence for a successful German capitalism. 
Then, on the other hand, there is the question of how a more 
liberal political system could have been achieved. These are not 
the same guestion. Thus there is no dispute about the practices 
7- 
of the most powerful fraction of German capital before 1914, 
which by most of the standards we've grown accustomed to since 
1945 were extremely reactionary. But whether they were really in 
conflict with the needs of capitalist reproduction is a very 
different matter. To put this more positively, it may be that 
such practices owed more to the special circumstances of the 
industries concerned--and even to their very "modernityw--than to 
the influence of any "pre-industrial" mentalities. 
(dl More specifically, we might argue that the option of 
leading fractions of the German bourgeoisie for a politics of 
accommodation with the landowning class after 1871 was fully 
compatible with the continued pursuit of bourgeois interests in 
the sense indicated above. The bourgeoisie (or to be more exact, 
specific bourgeois fractions) entered the agrarian alliance not 
from a lack of upolitical self-confidence", but as the best means 
of securing certain political goals. The indifference to further 
"parliamentarization" of the Imperial Constitution came less from 
any "pre-industrial tradition" of authoritarianism, than from a 
rational calculation of political interest in a situation where 
greater parliamentary reform necessarily worked to the advantage 
of the Left, and specifically the Social Democrats. Similarly, 
it make perfect sense for German capita1ist.s to refuse the "just" 
demands of the working class, providing they could get away with 
it, that is, when a given level of monopoly organization endowed 
them with the power to do so.44 Thus it was not the absence of 
bourgeois revolution that forced a supine bourgeoisie into a 
junior partnership with a "pre-industrial power elite", but the 
particular form of Germany's bourgeois revolution (revolution 
from above under the aegis of the Prussian state through military 
unification) that combined with the accelerated character of 
Germany's capitalist transformation to impose a specific logic of 
class alliance. The latter entailed no renunciation of bourgeois 
political ambition. But it did mean that ambitions were 
articulated in ways considerably different from those in Britain 
and France. To this extent we should speak not of German 
peculiarity, but of British, French, and German particularities. 
(el Finally, this also has implications for our 
understanding of fascism, which can't be discussed in detail 
here, but can certainly be raised. Once we become sceptical 
about the argument from "pre-industrial traditions" when applied 
to the political culture of the Second Empire, the deep- 
historical view of the origins of Nazism is also cast into doubt. 
Clt the very least, this means shifting our attention from- the 
l o n ~ u e  duree of Prussian history (the bureaucratic, militarist, 
and authoritarian traditions which embodied the special position 
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of the Junkers as a feudal or "pre-industrial" ruling class) 
towards the internal dynamics of the Imperial period itself 
(i.e., the specific contradictions of a society experiencing 
accelerated capitalist transformation). Personally9 I would take 
this further to stress the more immediate circumstances of the 
Nazis' rise to power--namely, the succeeding conjunctures of the 
First World War9 the post-war crisis of 1917-23, the relative 
stabilization of the mid-1920~~ and the world economic crisis 
after 1929. At all events, it is surely time to stop blaminq the 
Junkers for all the ills of German history, not (obviously) to 
exculpate them morally or to demonize the capitalist bourgeoisie 
in their stead, but to get a better grasp of the full 
complexities of the German social formation. 
In general9 this is an argument auainst notions of German 
exceptionalism- It suggests that we should think again about the 
assumed absence of bourgeois revolution in nineteenth-century 
Germany and accept that the bourgeoisie may come to social 
predominance by other than liberal routes. Finally, it is meant 
to query the simple continuity thesis which locates Germany's 
vulnerability to fascism in "pre-industrial" blockages of 
"modernization". On the contrary, it may now be far more useful 
. . .  - 
to examine the particular forms of German capitalist development 
and the structure of politics these determined. In other words, 
Germany's failure to develop a native liberalism of more vitality 
may have lain with the conditions of capitalist reproduction 
themselves, and not with the continuing domination of a "pre- 
industrial power elite". At least, this is worth discussing. 
n 
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stimulating some further discussion beyond the circles of German 
historians. It is freely offered as an intellectual provocation. 
It should go without saying that the argument is my own 
responsibility, and that David Blackbourn doesn't necessarily 
agree with all of it, although I hope that he does. 
In the meantime, versions of this paper have been 
presented to a variety of audiences, whose reactions have always 
been valuable. Aside from the History Department at Plichiqan 
itself, where I have come to take the high quality of 
intellectual exchange for granted, a seminar at University of 
California, Davis, in October 1985 was particularly useful. - I am 
heavily indebted to the ideas and criticisms of friends, among 
whom David Blackbourn, Jane Caplan, David Crew, Dieter Groh, 
Keith Nield, Gareth Stedman Jones, and Ron Suny deserve 
particular mention- I am extremely grateful to Maurice Zeitlin 
for encouragement in preparing the present text, and to Robert 
Brenner for an exceptionally careful and penetrating reader's 
4 t  I .  
report- Finally, I would like to thank Jurgen Kocka, Hans-Jurgen 
Puhle, Hans-Ulrich Uehler, and Heinrich August Uinkler, whose 
reviews of tlvthen deutscher Geschichtsschreibunq removed any 
doubts that the argument was worth pursuing. 
NOTES 
1. Moore 1966, asp. Ch. VII-VIII; Dahrendorf 1968; Poulantzas 
1973, esp. pp. 160-84. 
2. Sombart 1909, p. 608. 
3. Rxtenslve references to the detailed llterature on the 
Kalserrefch would needlesely clutter the argument. The 
most important Influence on recent wrltlngs has been 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, whose work incorporates the 
perspectlve of bourgeois failure/subordination wlth 
mfaillng consistency. His magnum opus, Bismarck und 
der Im~erialisaaus, is not available in Bnglish, but his 
text-book, Das deutsche Kalserreich 1879-1918, has now 
been translated as The German Empire, 1871-1918. Two 
useful essays are also translated: wBismarck8s 
imperialism, 1862-1090"; and 'Industrial growth and 
early German lmperiallsm." A good general text-book 
reflecting the same standpoint is Volkar R. Berghahn, 
mrmany and the Approach of War in 3914, together wlth 
the same author's Modern Germany. Society, Economy and 
Polltlcs ln the Twentieth Century. Two particularly 
Anfluentla1 assays are: Wolfgang Sauer, "Das Problem 
des deutschen Ifationalstaates," and Fritz Stern, "The 
political consequences of the unpolltlcal Oerman." 
Collections of representative essays translated from 
the Oerman may be found in James J. Sheehan (ed.), 
Ia~erial Germany, and Georg Iggera (ed.), The Social 
History of Politics. Critical Prespectives in West 
German Historical Writing since 1945. Finally, the 
essays edited by Richard J. Bvana, .Societv and Politics 
in Wilhelmine Oeraan, offered the beginnings of some 
alternative approaches and my own essays in From 
Unification to Razlsm. Reinternretinu the Oerman Past, 
try to explore these further. Finally, there are now a 
number of general historlographical essays reviewing 
the impact of the debates of the last twenty years 
concerning the course of German history under the 
Kaiserreich, which provide excellent access to tho 
broader literature relwant to my discussion in this 
text: Robert O. Moeller, aThe Kaiserreich recast? 
Contlnulty and change in modern Oerman historiographyn; 
James N. Retallack, mSocirl history with a vengeance? 
Some reactions to H.-U. Weh1er8s 'Das deutsche 
Kaiserreichm; Roger Fletcher, ORecent developments in 
German historiography: the Bielefeld uchool and its 
c r i t i ~ s , ~  and the same author's nIntroductionn to Fritz 
Fischer, From Kaiserreich to Third Reich. Elements of 
Continuity in Oerman Elstory, 1871-1945; Iggers, 
nIntroduction,n in Iggers (ed.), Social History of 
Politics; Richard J. Evans, "The myth of Oerrany8s 
missing revoluti~n.~ 
4. This ie especially clear in Wehler 1972. 
5. Fraenkel 1964, p. 27. 
Dahrendorf 1968, p. 14. 
Bracher 1969, p. 1339. 
Dahrendorf 1968, p. 398. 
Wehler 1973, p. 14 (the quotation is taken from the 
Xntroduction, whfch la omitted from the Bnglish 
translation).' 
Wehler 1973, pp. 140, 238. (In references to Wehler's text- 
book I have retained by own translations of the 
original, which differ slightly from the formulations 
of the Bnglish translated edition; henceforth the page 
references to the latter will be given In parenthesis, 
in this case Wehler 1986, pp. 136, 248.) 
lor a good example of such an apgsoach, see Wlnkler 1976. 3% 
have discussed the problem of fascism in this context 
In "What produces fasclsm: pre-Industrial traditions or 
r crisis of the capitalist state?" Bley 1986, pp. 254- 
82. 
lkhrendorf 1968, p. 404. 
Puhlo 1972, p. 63. 
To argue tbat a common heritage of assumptions informs the 
work of many differant historian6 isn't to argue that 
their approaches and interpretations are otherwise the 
same; and to question those assumptions isn't to impugn 
the value of previous writings or the value of their 
scholarly contributions. In fact, to argue that, say, 
liberals and Marxists mhare certain common conceptions 
of progress, particularly in the later-nineteenth 
century context we are dealing with, is hardly a very 
original observation. To take a basic example: both 
Bhrx and Weber shared the earre crltlque of the Oerman 
bourgeoisie and its historic deficiencies, and for our 
purposes may be regarded as its respective pioneers. 
But to identify much an underlying community of 
discourse does not mean that Mam, Weber, and their 
asmociated,traditiom of analysis are being generally 
contlated. What It can suggest is that, if left 
-examined, cruch assumptions perpetuate certain 
patters of understanding and foreclose others. In 
this sense, my rim Is to bring that well establlahed 
tradition of explanation into question by exposing its 
logic, identifying some weaknesses and contradictions, 
and suggesting some of the possible consequences. My 
own suggestlone are obviously not Immune to criticism, 
and are offered as a basis for interesting debate. 
15. Of course, this is not universally true of post-war non- 
blarxist developmental theory, and some central 
Influences, most prominently Alexander Oerschenkron and 
Barrington Moore, have alwaym positioned themselves 
more positively (or at least, ambiguously) in relation 
to the classical tradition. But the main weight of 
developmental theory, particularly where oriented 
towards policy issues in the Third World, was towards a 
anon-revolut ionaryn concept ion of nmodernizat ion. 
See, for instance, the theoretical framework of Charles 
Tilly 1975, which wa8 a deliberate (and slightly 
mhsepish) attempt to re-engage this dehlstoricized 
modernization theory with the founding experiences of 
Buropean history from which it had been fairly 
systematically disconnected, but without re-admitting 
the centrality of the great revolutionary upheavals of 
1617-161'8; neither the Reformation nor the seventeenth 
century revolutions figure seriously in the otherwise 
impressive analyues of the volume. More recently, 
perhaps, the emergence of r flourishing and variegated 
body of historical sociology in Britain and the USA has 
created the conditions under which the questions 
( 
previously articulated via the concept of bourgeois 
revoltuion right be revisited. 
16. As Jane Caplan say8, over the last two decades or so.there 
has been a wlthering away of the class subject in 
Marxiat discussion, involving a growing I1refusal of the 
closed and aprioristlc totality of traditional Marxist 
social imagery, with its attendant structure of given 
correspondences between the economic and the political, 
its dependence on class subjects, its evolutionary 
teleol~gy.~ In British Marxism this began with the 
Althusser reception in the early 1970s, proceeded 
through a variety of frequently tortuous discussions, 
41 
and reached an unsettling climax in Brnesto Laclau's 
and Chantal Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(London, 1986). Common to this current thinking "is 
the belief that class alone Is no longer an adequate 
concept of political analysis and practice, but that 
the prospective forces of radical social transformation 
are dispersed among a eeries of molecular social 
movements--feminism, local state activism, black 
caucuses, and so on. These are not waiting to be 
convened into unifid political movement by the 
intervention of a presiding party, but have an efficacy 
derived precisely from pluralism rather than 
concentrati~n.~ As Caplan perceptively notes, the 
theoretical skepticism about the older notion of the 
class subject these contemporary positions reflect also 
lies behind the argument in David Blackbourn's and my 
PeculAarities of- German History, applied in this case 
to the collectlvo agency of the bourgeoisie, as opposed 
to the proletariat. see- Jane Caplan, nMyths, models, 
and rleslng revolutions: comments on a debate in German 
history," 1986, p. 97. 
17. Laclau 1977, pp. Blff. 
18. There is a helpful diecueelon of the reductionism/economism 
problem in this particular context in Hall 1986, pp. 
19. Thompson 1978, p. 47. In the meantime (Thompson's essay was 
original~y published in 1965), twenty years of 
scholarship on the French Revolution have given these 
words even greater effect. These are BOW many 
diecussions of the debate to which Thompson's essay was 
a central contribution. The most useful are: Johnson 
1980, pp. 48-70; Wield 1980, pp. 479-506; Anderson 
1980. See also Sgohn 1983. 
20. SteQman Jones 1977, pp. 86, 88. 
21. Ibld. p. 87. 
22. Thls Is arguably one of the least understood problems in 
nineteenth century European history. Tor example, the 
inadequacies of Spring 1978, reflect the general 
absence of serious research in the area. On the other 
hand, some recent texts are very suggestive of where 
the latter might begin: Hassey and Catalano 1978; 
Cannadine 1980; Davis 1979; Hussain and Tribe 1981; 
Schissler 1986; Winson 1982. The comparative volume 
edited by Blinkhorn and Gibson (forthcoming), should 
help remedy the gap. 
23. POT some general discussion of this point, see Therborn 
1977. 
24. Thls is very much the positlon of Christopher Hill, and 
seems to be that of Eobsbawm 1975. For a recent 
restatement of the former's views, 6ee Hill 1980. See 
also this statement from Isaac Deutscher's TrevePyan 
Lectures, quoted by Hi11 1971, p. 127f.: Deutscher 
criticized " the traditional vieww that "the bourgeoisie 
played the leading part, stood at the head of the 
insurgent people, and seized power." He argued that 
.this conception, to whatever authorities it may be 
attributed, is schematic'and historically unreal. Prom 
1t one may well arrive at the conclusion that the 
bourgeois revolution is almost a myth, and that it has 
hardly ever occurred, even in the West. Capltallst 
entrepreneurs, merchants, and bankers were not 
conspicuous among the leaders of the Puritans or the 
commanders of the Ironsides, in the Jacobfn Club or at 
the head of thecrowds that stormed the Bastille or 
invaded the Tuileries...Yet the bourgeois character of 
these revolutions wlll not appear at all mythical, if 
we approach them with a broader criterion and view 
their general impact on society. Their most 
mubutantial urd enduring achievement was to sweep away 
the social and political institutions that had hindered 
the growth of bourgeois property and of the social 
relationships that went with it ... Bourgeois revolution 
creates the conditions in which bourgeois property can 
flourish. In this, rather than in the particular 
alignments during the struggle, lies its differentia 
s~ecifica.~ He continued: "The irrationality of the 
Puritan and Jacobin revolutions arose largely out of 
the clash between the high hopes of the insurgent 
peoples and the bourgeois firitations of those 
revolutions. To the Insurgent masses no revolution Is 
ever bourgeois. They fight for fseedsm and equality or 
for the brotherhood of men [sic] and the Comm~nwealth.~ 
See Deutscher 1967, pp. 21f., 27. 
25. Uarx 1973, p. 192f. 
26. -11 1986, p. 51, also for the following quotation. 
27. Stedman Jones 1977, p. 86. 
28. Thompson 1978, p. 47. This aspect of Thompson's argument 
&as also been taken up by Corrigan and Sayer 1985. 
29. This Is also the argumentation of Blackbournls part of T&
Peculiarities of German History (although the latter is 
also more than that): "The discreet charm of the 
bourgeoisie: reappraising German history In the 
nfneteenth centurytB1 pp. 169-292. In the meantime, the 
Idea has also been taken up by ~iargen Kocka as the 
basis of r major research project at the Univessity of 
Bielafeld, "Burgerturn, ~iirgerlichkeit und biirgerliche 
Oesellschaft. Das 19. Jahrhundert im europaischen 
Vergleich." See Kocka 1986a and 1986b. However, as 
Kocka8s work still shows (so far at least), it is 
possible both to acknowledge the cultural dimension of 
the argument and at the same time to retain the older 
conception of the German bourgeoisle*~ political 
subordination and failure. 
30. For the latter, see the following exegeses: Sassoon 1980, 
pp. 204-17; ~uci-Qlucbmann 1979, pp. 207-36; Qinsborg 
1979, pp. 31-66, together with Davis's own 
Introduction, ibid., pp. 11-30. 
31. My thinking In this directJon was originally stimulated by a 
paper preaonted by Perry Anderson on the subject of 
bourgeois revolutions to a group in Cambridge in spring 
1977. 
32. Tom lalrn'u writings on nationalism in the mid-1970s were 
very stimulating on this subject. See Nairn 1977, asp. 
pp. 92ff., 329ff. In r strong form the idea of kneven 
and combined developmentn originates with Trotuky 1906, 
and has been exhaustively and critlcally dlecussed in 
33. Hot that non-Marxists have been m y  better! For a helpful 
start, see Oineborg 1979. One of the most lucid 
presentations of the problem in the abstract may be 
found in Perry Anderuon'u reply to Thompson, Arguments 
Within Bnaliuh Marxism, pp. 69-99, esp. 73-77; for 
Thompson's original utatements, see Thompson 1978, pp. 
103-397, esp. 276-96. 
I 
.34. Karl Marx 1976, p. 425f. 
35. See, for instance, Brenner 1978, which is notably 
inconclusive on this ucore. 
36. His most recent statement directly on the uubject is the 
essay cited In note 24 above. But see also the 
wConclwionn to Hill 1975, pp. 278-84. For a sen8e of 
the older certainties, mee the Special Tercentary 
number of.The Modern Quarterly on the English 
Revolution '1649--1949," New Series, 4 (Spring 1949). 
with contributions by (among others) A. E. Morton, 
Christopher Hiff and I!. D. (Edmund Dell). 
37. See Hllton 1976, and the debate around Brenner 1976. The 
contributions to the latter have been collected in 
Aston and Phllpin (1986). Another recent general 
survey of the debate, Holton 1985, ignores the issue of 
bourgeois revolution completely. 
38. For a good lnt~oductlon to the former, see Richardson 1977, 
pp. 89-125, and for the latter, Aston 1970. More 
recently, there have been some signs that the 
willingness of British historians to engage with the 
problem of the English Revolution may be reviving. See 
Stone's recent statement, 1985, pp. 44-54. Despite its 
own excessive cautlon, there is a useful survey of 
current approaches in Coward 1986, pp. 9-39. The 
author's nominalist answer is: Yes, but we can't define 
what kind of revolution it was, as all general models 
of revolution are by definition suspect. On the other 
hand, Jonathan Clark, the aspirant high priest of an 
extremely peculiar new right history, manages to get 
through an entire book on the subject of nrevolution 
and rebellionn without ever discussing the immediate 
effects of the Civil War on "state and societyn at all 
G 
(Cromwell, Commonwealth, and Protectorate are 
completely absent from the account). See Clark 1986. 
39. These comments refer in the first instance to work in the 
Bnglish-speaking world, where the sequential impact of 
Alfred Cobban and Richard Cobb in their different ways 
effectively pre-empted ambitious generalizing about the . 
character of the French Revolution. They apply far less to 
work in France Itself, where the character of the Revolution 
remains a matter of hot and lively debate (not least, one 
assumes, in the context of the forthcoming celebrations of 
1989). For a taste, see the following: Soboul 1971; Furet 
1971; Mazauric 1975; Vovelle 1977. A collection of Furet's 
essays is now available in English: Furet 1981. 
40. As partial exceptions we may note the following: Stone 
1972; Furet 1981; Lucas 1973. See also Baker 1981. 
41. Winkler 1979, p. 15. 
42. I have tried to make a start at analyzing the character of 
the Imperial state in my part of Peculiarities of 
German History, pp. 127-43. 
43. This latter context is brilliantly invoked in Caplan 1986, 
pp. 94-98. . . .. .- .. 
. . 
44. I have discussed this question more fully in my part of 
Peculiarities of German History, pp. 98-126, and in 
Resha~ina the German Riaht 1980, pp. 293-315. See also 
nCapitallsm and the Wilhelmine state: industrial growth 
and political backwardness, 1890-1918," in From 
Unification to Nazism, pp. 42-68. David Crew has also 
explored this line of argument in Crew 1979, pp. Iff, 
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